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11. Introduction
Beginning in November 1997, Korean economy underwent a devastating economic crisis.
Declining macroeconomic conditions brought about major labor market disruptions in 1998:
a quadrupling of unemployment, a fall of 9% in real wages, informalization of the remaining
jobs, increased job insecurity, and rising poverty and inequality. Disadvantaged groups
suffered a disproportionate impact. The result was not only economic misery but also social
pain: increased homelessness, rising crime, heightened school dropouts, an accelerating
divorce rate, and an overwhelming sense of social malaise.
1999 marked a major turnaround for Korea. GDP grew by more than 10.7%, and real
wages increased apace. Unemployment began to fall as well as long term unemployment.
The unemployment rate is now less than half of its peak level. Youth and women are again
returning to the labor force and are finding employment.
The rapid decrease of unemployment owes, above all, to the economic upturn at high
growth rate since 1999. Low interest rate, depreciated value of won, policy initiatives to
bring up venture enterprises, together with favorable international economic environment
such low oil price and increased demand of semiconductor chips must have contributed to the
rapid recovery. Precise analysis of it will require other separate papers. This paper focuses on
dramatic changes in the Korean labor market after the financial crisis and critically assesses
the employment and unemployment measures taken by the government vis-à-vis the labor
market turmoil.
Section 2 examines briefly the labor market evolution after the crisis. Section 3 treats,
with critical assessments, the government’s effort to cope with the adverse shock in the labor
market. Summary and some remaining issues are given in Section 4.
2. Labor Market Context
With the adverse shock, Korean labor market fell into an unprecedented turmoil.
Unemployment soared up from day to day. Non-regular workers and low-educated workers
suffered disproportionately the adverse impact. Jobs were precarized. A disadvantaged hard-
core group in the Korean labor market experienced unemployment recurrently even if they
did not fall into the long-term unemployment trap.
22.1. Increases in Involuntary Unemployment
Besides the high unemployment, one of outstanding features of the labor market was a
substantial increase of involuntarily dismissed workers, in particular, the unemployment due
to deterioration of business or no more work. It was the single most prevalent reason for
unemployment in the early 1998 (29.7%) and since then dramatically increased to 43.6% by
the mid-1998 (<Table 1>). The number of involuntarily unemployed grew by tens and
thousands per month. The Ministry of Labor had to expand the capacity of public
employment service agencies to pay unemployment benefits and provide job information.
<Table 1> Unemployment by Reasons of Separation
   (Unit: thousands, %)
1998.1 1998.7 1999.7 2000.7
No. of the Unemployed1) 669 1,381 1,029 631
Personal Reasons2)
Business Shut-Down
Lay-Off
Business Deterioration
   /No More Work
 Other Reasons3)
179 (26.8)
123 (18.4)
97 (14.5)
199 (29.7)
71 (10.6)
289 (20.9)
173 (12.5)
234 (16.9)
602 (43.6)
83 ( 6.0)
335 (32.6)
65 (6.3)
123 (12.0)
306 (29.7)
 199(19.3)
285(45.2)
36(5.7)
38(6.0)
175(27.7)
98(15.5)
Note : 1) Those who lost their job less than a year ago.
2) Includes personal or family-related reasons, retirement, dissatisfaction with the
working condition and/or pay, etc.
3) Includes termination of temporary or seasonal works or projects.
Source: National Statistical Office, Monthly Employment Trends, various issues.
2.2. Disproportionate Impact on Non-regular Employees and Low-educated Workers
Non-regular employees and low educated workers suffered a disproportionate impact of
the economic crisis. A dominant portion of the involuntarily unemployed people came out of
non-regular workers and low-educated workers. Unemployment rate of the low educated
(Middle school and below in <Table 2>) almost quadrupled between 1997 and 1998.
Unemployment rate of high school graduates increased less, but two times and a half as high
as the former level.
As of Dec. 1999, the proportion of non-regular employees was about 52.9% of the total
number of wage workers. In contrast, they explained about 82.1% of the unemployed wage
workers. <Table 3> shows that non-regular employees were principal group who experienced
3unemployment. Daily workers and large part of temporary workers were not covered by EIS
while they have been more in need of a safety net, raising one of the major policy issues
challenging current social safety-net system.
<Table 2> Unemployment Rates by Educational Level
(Unit: %)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Aug.
Total Unemployment 2.0 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 3.7
By educational level
  Middle school or below
  High school
  College and university or above
1.1
2.5
2.7
1.1
2.5
2.6
1.5
3.3
3.0
5.8
8.2
5.7
5.2
7.6
5.3
3.1
4.4
3.2
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey database
<Table 3> Employees and Unemployed Employees by Employment Status, Dec. 1999
     (Unit: thousands, %)
Employees Unemployed employees byformer status1)
Total 13,024 (100.0) 660 (100.0)
  Regular 6,131 (47.1) 118 (17.9)
  Temporary 4,468 (34.3) 236 (35.8)
  Daily 2,426 (18.6) 306 (46.4)
Note: 1) Those who lost their job less than a year ago.
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey database
<Box 1> Classification of employees by status
It is a common tradition in the analysis of the Korean labor market that employees are
classified into three categories: regular employees, temporary employees and daily
employees. Statistically, regular employees are defined for operational purposes as
employees whose employment contract spans, implicitly or explicitly, more than a year or
is without any fixed term. Temporary employees are defined as employees who have an
employment contract lasting between a month and a year. Daily employees are those
employees whose contract period is less than a month.
In reality, however, the usage of those terms has nuances other than just demarcation by
contract period. Temporary employees can be fixed term contract workers or project based
employees. It is not rare that their employment period exceeds one year or is without any
fixed term; as is the case with most of part-time employees and dispatched employees.
They are highly substitutable with other workers as their jobs do not require professional
skills. Employers can freely dismiss them without offering any severance pay. The
4employer, regardless of regulations in law, does not contribute a social insurance premium
for them as their wage is considered to be inclusive of severance pay, social insurance
premium, etc. In many cases, the employer does not keep their employment records so they
cannot prove their employment career. Temporary employees are, in the usual sense,
equivalent to atypical or non-regular employees.
Daily employees in practical usage can be understood as a subset of temporary
employees. They are paid on a daily basis and their employment spans a well-defined
project. The employment contract is terminated automatically when the project is
completed, even if they remain under the same employer or Shipjang.1 They frequently
move from one work place to another. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish them from the
self-employed. They conclude a contract as an independent contractor as if they are a self-
employed when they have opportunity of getting independent jobs, such as repairing or
petty construction.
Regular employees are those whose employment contract period is not fixed. Their
employment is stable. Their wage increases on the basis of seniority and they have a
predictable promotion path. They fully enjoy the social insurance advantage as regulated
by law.
The National Statistical Office takes into consideration these common sense meanings
during surveys. When it is difficult to distinguish if an employee is regular or temporary,
whether or not he/she is expected to receive severance pay serves as an important criterion
during the survey. If an employee is not expected to receive retirement pay from the
employer, even if the employment contract is without fixed term, he/she is classified as a
temporary employee. If an employee is paid on daily basis even when he/she is expected to
work more than a month in a workplace, he/she is classified as a daily employee.
2.3. Increase in Discouraged Youth and Unemployment of Elderly Workers
As commonly observed in other countries, unskilled youth and the low educated are the
most vulnerable group in the midst of structural adjustment. With the upbringing of the crisis,
firms froze the recruitment, and tens and thousands of new graduates were left jobless.
Having searched for jobs in vain, a substantial portion of them (in particular, young female
graduates), being discouraged, might have withdrawn from the labor market.
Firms not only restricted the recruitment but also appealed to so-called ‘honored’
retirement program by providing an incentive in severance payment for those who
voluntarily applied for the retirement program. Unemployment rate among elderly workers
(55 and over in <Table 4>), even though not so high as the general unemployment level,
abruptly increased from 0.3% in 1997 up to 3.3 in 1998. It increased further in 1999 while
                                                                
1 Shipjang is an informal organizer of the manpower pool in the construction industry. He is not an officially
permitted employer or business owner but concludes a contract with the construction company as an
independent contractor to perform a process of construction. Traditionally, any experienced worker who is able
to organize a group of craftsmen and workers in the construction industry has played a role as a Shipjang when
he finds a small construction project.
5unemployment level of the other age groups decreased.
<Table 4> Unemployment Rates by Age Group
        (Unit: %)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Aug.
Total Unemployment 2.0 2.0 2.6  6.8  6.3 3.7
By age group
  15-24
  25-29
  30-54
  55 and over
6.3
3.0
1.2
0.6
6.1
3.4
1.2
0.5
7.6
4.1
1.7
0.9
16.0
 9.3
 5.6
 3.3
14.2
 8.5
 5.2
 3.5
9.0
5.1
3.1
1.4
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey database
2.4. Precarization of the Work Force
<Graph 1> Trends in the Proportion of Wage Workers by Employment Type
(Unit: % of total wage workers)
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey database.
The proportion of regular workers was about 54.1% in 1997 and since then gradually
decreased to about 48.0% in Aug. 2000, while the proportion of temporary and daily workers
increased from 31.6% and 14.3% to 34.2% and 17.8% respectively during the same span.
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6(<Graph 1>). This tendency of non-regular worker increase was observed even before the
crisis but the crisis accentuated the trend.
The observed composition of the employment indicates that large part of the employment
was transformed into unstably employed non-regular employees. Even with the economic
recovery, the situation was not improved remarkably. Between 1998 and Aug. 2000,
unemployment rate decreased from 6.8% to 6.3% and the number of workers employed
increased by 1.3 million. But the number of regular workers decreased by 0.23 million (3.5%
decrease), while temporary workers and daily workers increased by 0.44 million (11.0%
increase) and 0.57 million (32.9% increase) respectively.
2.5. Recurrent Unemployment
The proportion of the long-term unemployed (6 months and over) steeply increased month
after month from 5.7% in 1998:Q1 to above 20.5% by 1998:Q3 and stays at around 14% this
year, which is lower than the pre-crisis level. It was relatively high only during
1998:Q3~1999:Q3. Long-term unemployment for more than 12 months showed the similar
evolution: its proportion increased from 0.7% in 1998:Q1 to 4.1% by 1999:Q2 (<Graph 2>)
and it has not been higher than the pre-crisis level.
<Graph 2> Long-term Unemployment as a Percentage of Total Unemployment
Source: National Statistical Office, Economically Active Population Survey database.
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7Seemingly the cumulative effect of high unemployment did not lead to the perpetuation of
long-term unemployment as was predicted by some economists just after the crisis. The
percentage of the long term employed is relatively low compared to that of European
countries and North American countries (<Table 5>). It is expected not to increase any more.
Unemployment outflow rate has been high despite the unfavorable labor market condition.
Large portion of precarious workers are experiencing short unemployment span. However,
about a third of those who experience unemployment during Jan. 1998~June, 1999 are found
to have experienced unemployment recurrently. As for non-regular employees, 77.5% of
them experienced unemployment more than twice during given 18 months (B.Y. Lee, 2000).
A disadvantaged hard-core group in the Korean labor market did not fall into the long-term
unemployment trap, but a “recurrent unemployment trap”.
<Table 5> Long Term Unemployment in OECD Countries, 1999
        (Unit: % of total unemployment)
6 months and over 12 months and over
Canada 21.4 11.6
France 55.5 40.3
Germany 67.2 51.7
Italy 77.2 61.3
Japan 44.5 22.4
Korea 18.6 3.8
United Kingdom 45.7 29.8
United States 12.3 6.8
European Union 63.7 47.5
Total OECD 46.2 31.2
Source: OECD (2000), Employment Outlook.
3. Employment and Unemployment Measures
Faced with high and increasing unemployment, the Korean government put out diverse
and intense measures to alleviate the adverse impact of the crisis on the labor market. The
measures taken by the government can be classified into five categories: (1) job creation, (2)
training for reemployment, (3) UI benefit and social care, (4) job keeping, and (5) public
employment services (PES) and labor market information (LMI) system
8To implement the unemployment policy measures, Korean government allocated about 10
trillion won in 1998, about 15.8 trillion won in 1999. If we count the budget on
unemployment measures in proper sense, it was 5.7 trillion won in 1998 and 9.2 trillion won
1999 respectively. It is expected to be 5.9 trillion won in 2000. Approximately 1.4% of GDP
on average has been set aside for unemployment policies for three consecutive years after the
crisis (<Table 6>).
<Table 6> Budget on Unemployment Measures
                                       (Unit: 100 million won)
Unemployment Measures 1998 1999 2000
Total (% of GDP) 56,672(1.3)
92,400
(1.9)
59,220
(1.1)
(1) Public Works Program 10,444 26,218 11,000
(2) Training for Reemployment 8,351 5,832 3,509
(3) Social Care for the Jobless 35,993 54,482 40,252
(4) PES & LMI System 660 1,036 796
(5) Job Keeping 1,224 4,832 3,663
Note: If the budget on expansion of SOC Investments, support for venture enterprises and
support for SMEs is included, total expenditure amounts to 10.1 trillion won in 1998,
15.8 trillion won in 1999, 6.7 trillion won in 2000.
Source: Ministry of Labor.
3.1. Job Creation
Measures for job creation includes (a) creating new jobs by supporting and subsidizing
new businesses start-ups, and (b) providing temporary or relief works for unemployed
workers such as public works program.
To create new jobs by financially supporting new business start-ups, privileged financial
credit (300-500 million per business) was provided for starting small business firms and
venture enterprises that have good business plans. Newly starting small firms and venture
enterprises were exempt from acquisition taxes and registration taxes. The government
expanded public SOC investment of which the employment-generating effect was judged to
be important.
Public works projects (PWPs) and internship programs were introduced on large scale to
provide temporary work opportunities not only for the low-income unemployed but also for
new entrants to the labor market who failed to find a job. PWPs had achieved, in this way,
two policy objectives: creation of temporary job opportunities enabling job seekers to
9maintain their connection with labor market, and protection of the basic livelihood of the
unemployed.
The PWPs were operated on a three-month unit period basis. They were implemented as a
two-stage project in 1998 (Phase I: from May to August; Phase II: from September to
December), and as a four-stage project in 1999 (Phase I: from January to March; Phase II:
from April to June; Phase III: from July to September; Phase IV: from October to December).
An eligible person could participate up to 3 unit periods. Between consecutive periods a
10-day break was given to the participants. Although designed primarily for male heads of
household, the projects also attracted many female workers who were excluded from other
job opportunities. At the later stage, female heads were given higher priority.
PWPs were divided into the central government’s projects and local governments’
projects. Local governments and ministries of the central government were allowed to
propose various PWPs. Various database-building and public service projects were
performed2: forestation, construction of cyber libraries, on-site monitoring of unemployment
policy programs, restoration and maintenance of social welfare facilities and public facilities,
etc.
Selection criteria could be different depending on the characteristics of the projects. For
the projects administered by local governments, screening for participation were made based
on scores assigned to the following 9 items: age(10), householder(10), number of dependents
(15), property ownership(20), household income(10), female householder(5), handicapped(5),
duration of unemployment(10), and participation in previous public works projects(10).
In principle, those who were eligible for PWPs should be 18 to 60 years old at the time of
application. They should be unemployed or daily workers without regular income, or the
homeless whose status can be verified by the administrative agencies or organizations
recognized by such administrative agencies. Recipients of unemployment benefits were not
eligible regardless of the amount of their benefits. However, spouses of those who received
less than 300,000 won as unemployment benefits were eligible for public works. The daily
wage rate for participants depended on the type and difficulty of work.
The expenditure on PWPs amounted to 1 trillion won in 1998 and 2.5 trillion won in 1999
(<Table 7>). About 2.2 million eligible people participated in PWPs since it first started in
May, 1998. Participants worked less than 5 months on average in the programs. Monthly
average of participants amounted to 0.3 million.
The PWPs proved to be very effective unemployment measures. They provided earnings
opportunities both to low income families and the unemployed people who urgently needed
                                                                
2 See Lee and Kim (2000) for more details.
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social protection. More than 50% of the unemployed were found to have participated in the
PWPs (Lee and Kim, 2000). Majority of participants were those disadvantaged such as low-
skilled, less educated, former non-regular workers, women and elderly workers who were
excluded from other institutionalized unemployment measures, such as UI benefits and loan
schemes. Their wage level was substantially lower than that of previous jobs. Participants
were quite satisfied with the management and outcomes of the PWPs, except for wage level
and program duration. They wanted the programs to be continued and preferred the PWPs to
unemployment assistance (Lee and Kim, 2000). PWPs were, thus, found to be more effective
than expected in providing income support for the unemployed as well as for other low
income families.
<Table 7> Budget for Public Works Projects in 1999 and Number of Persons Covered
         by Project Types
(Unit: 100 million won, 1000 persons)
Total Phase Ⅰ Phase Ⅱ Phase Ⅲ Phase Ⅳ
Total
Budget
No. of persons
Covered
24,924
1,599
4,780
410
7,456
450
6,344
373
6,344
366
Central
Gov’t
PWPs
Budget
No. of persons
Covered
10,624
636
1,180
120
3,056
170
3,194
173
3,194
173
Local Gov’t
PWPs
Budget
No. of persons
Covered
14,300
963
3,600
290
4,400
280
3,150
200
3,150
193
Source: Lee and Kim (2000).
Monitoring results and advisory comments were reflected quasi-instantaneously during
the program implementation. In the beginning, the wage rate ranged from 22,000 won to
35,000 won a day. The wage rate for PWPs were far higher than the minimum wage and
could exert a negative effect on the low-end labor market. Responding to the monitoring
results, the government cut the wage rate by 3,000 won on October 1, 1998, and further by
3,000 won in 1999. Currently, the daily wage rate ranges from 19,000 won to 29,000 won.
Programs were not without shortfalls. In the early stage of the program, appropriate
screening mechanisms were not well prepared and some well-off people were monitored to
be participating in the program, while many poor unemployed people were excluded. The
disadvantaged participants had a tendancy to be dependent upon the PWPs perennially. This
“unemployment trap” was particularly daunting for people whose chance of escaping from
unemployment was “underemployment” which could be judged worse than participating in
11
the public works projects (Lee and Kim, 2000). A kind of “employment illusion” was
confirmed. Some participants resisted to discontinuation of programs and requested
employment security.
As the labor market settles down, the government tries to make PWPs institutionally
managed programs with clearer targeting. PWPs need to be linked to active labor market
policies such as vocational training and employment services to avoid the negative lock-in
effect.
3.2. Job Training for Reemployment
Measures for job training aimed to train the unemployed to enhance their job skills and
thus increase their employability: retraining opportunities were provided and/or subsidized
for the unemployed; training opportunities were provided at the colleges and universities for
new graduates.
<Table 8> Participation in Reemployment Training for the Unemployed
(Unit: persons)
1998 1999
Total 362,941 358,351
Training for the Unemployed 333,541 324,623
 - Training for the Unemployed
  (those covered by EIS) 170,096 226,356
 - Training for the Unemployed
  (those not covered by EIS)
101,709 69,466
 - Training for Agricultural Jobs 5,126 -
- Training for the Unemployed
  New Graduates
43,012 21,076
 - Training for Business Start-Up 13,598 7,725
Manpower Development Training 29,400 33,728
 - Basic Skill Formation Training 14,515 16,817
 - Training for the 3D Jobs 11,000 9,122
 - Paid-Leave Training 3,885 7,789
Note: Employment Maintenance Training under EIS is not included
Source: Kang et al.(1999); Ministry of Labor
Since the onset of the economic crisis, the government has set up training programs
available to the unemployed. In 1998, about 0.36 million unemployed participated in and
benefited from various government-sponsored job training programs, approximately eight
times as many as those in the preceding year. The budget for vocational training amounted to
12
835 billion won in 1998. In 1999, the Ministry of Labor provided job training opportunities
for a little less than 0.36 million jobless workers (<Table 8>).
The unemployed workers who had worked at the firms covered by EIS were eligible for
reemployment training programs. They were allowed to participate in the training and
received training allowances which lasted from one month to one year, up to three times,
until they found a new job. Training allowances were cut in half if they keep participating in
the second training course and were reduced to zero for the third training course.
Training allowances were 200-300 thousand won (equivalent to 60-90% of the minimum
wage). Trainees who were learning skills for the "3D" (Dirty, Difficult, Dangerous) jobs,
which had been facing a labor shortage, received an additional bonus. Similar training
opportunities and benefits were offered to the unemployed not covered by EIS.
Job training programs for the unemployed provided for the unemployed opportunities to
retrain themselves to enhance their own future employability while training allowances
helped alleviate their economic difficulties.
However, moral hazard of some training institutions and trainees diminished the efficiency
of the expenditure on training. Some unqualified training institutions made a bad use of the
opportunities and participated as program providers purely as a money-making endeavor, i.e.
to get reimbursement from the government. Also, some trainees were interested only in
'being paid' the training allowances instead of acquiring skills.
Another inefficiency associated with the programs was the underdevelopment of the labor
market information system and the lack of experts to manage the training programs. The
qualification of training institutions and programs was made purely upon the preexisting
conditions such as available equipment, facilities, etc. Little consideration was given either to
changing labor market demands or to the needs of the potential participants. Training
institutions tended to routinely provide the same training programs to the unemployed as
were previously offered. And as a result, those private programs were not significantly
helpful in getting the trainees to be re-employed, which partly resulted from limited job
opportunities in the labor market.
3.3. Social Care for the Jobless
With severe economic recession and massive unemployment, poverty among the jobless
and the low-income families emerged as an important social issue that needed to be
immediately addressed. Measures for social care were implemented in two directions. First,
in order that EIS could care as many unemployed as possible, the coverage of EIS was
extended, qualification conditions were softened, and UI beneficiaries were given extra
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benefit days of up to 60 days. Second, the low-income jobless were given income or credit
support such as loans for living expenses (including family medical and educational
expenses), and other public aid benefits.
(1) Unemployment Benefits
In July 1995, before the Financial Crisis, Korea had put into place an employment
insurance system (EIS). The three components of this system are traditional unemployment
insurance (UIS), job training, and employment maintenance/promotion subsidies.
When EIS was first introduced in July 1995, the coverage of UIS was limited to workers
employed at firms with more than 30 employees. Faced with increasing unemployment and
wide-spread low-wage earners at small size firms with high probability of being unemployed,
the extension of UIS coverage was deemed critical for widening and strengthening social
protection of the unemployed. Thus, the Korean government extended the coverage of UIS to
firms with more than 10 employees (January, 1998), to firms with more than 5 employees
(March, 1998), and then, to all firms with at least one employee (in Oct., 1998). After the
three consecutive amendments of Employment Insurance Law in 1998, only those part-time
workers working more than 80 hours a month and daily workers employed less than a month
remained legitimately excluded from coverage of EIS.
<Table 9> Coverage Extension of EIS
Date Unemployment
Insurance
Employment Stabilization Program &
Job Skill Development Program
July 1, 1995 ³ 30 employees ³  70 employees
January 1, 1998 ³ 10 employees ³  50 employees
March 1, 1998 ³  5 employees ³  50 employees
July 1, 1998 ³  5 employees ³   5 employees
October 1, 1998 ³   1 employee ³    1 employee
The extension of EIS coverage could not be enough because being covered by EIS did not
suffice for the eligibility for UI benefit. Before the crisis, to be qualified for the benefit, one
must be involuntarily dismissed from the covered firms after working (or contributing
premiums) for more than 1 year out of last 18 months. Temporary workers and other unstably
employed workers working at small firms were hard to satisfy the condition. To better protect
those marginal workers and newly insured employees, the government relaxed qualification
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conditions for UI benefits, which includes relaxing the minimum contribution requirements
from 12 out of 18 months to 6 out of 12 months.
The duration of UI benefit varies depending on the insured employment period and the
age of the claimant. It ranged between a minimum of 60 days and a maximum of 210 days.
However since Korea's EIS was implemented on July 1, 1995, the insured period of
employees could not exceed five years and thus the actual duration of UI benefit would not
be able to exceed 150 days until June 30, 2000.
Given the limited benefit duration, extended benefit rule was put into operation from July
1998 so that the qualified unemployed could receive up to 60 days longer than the days
designated by the benefit duration matrix. And the UB duration matrix with from 60 to 210
days was modified to that with from 90 to 240 days. In this way average duration of UI
benefit receipt increased up to 126 days in 1999 while it was 85 days in 1997 and 91 days in
1998.
Despite all the efforts implemented by the government regarding the UIS, important
problems still remain. Even after the extension of coverage, the actual number of insured
employees fall far short of the expected number of employees to be covered. As of June 2000,
the compliance rate is only 70.6% and only 55.6% of the total wage workers are registered --
that is, there is a large gap between coverage de jure and coverage de facto. Many temporary
and daily workers are not registered yet and still out of protection.
<Table 10> Ratio of UI Beneficiaries over the Unemployed
Country Number of the
Unemployed (A)
Number of
Beneficiaries (B)
B/A*100
Germany (1990) 1,971 858 43.5
Japan (1992) 1,420 395 27.8
Korea (Dec. 1999) 1,040 102 9.8
U.S.A. (1990) 6,874 2,475 36.0
U.K. (1993) 2,900 870 30.0
Source: Phang (1999) and Hur (2000)
Even with the expansion of coverage, relaxation of eligibility criteria and lengthening of
benefit period, the percentage of the beneficiaries among the unemployed is too small for the
UIS to be the primary safety net for the unemployed. As of Dec. 1999, the percentage was
about 9.8, which is considerably lower than that of other OECD countries (<Table 10>). Four
reasons can be addressed. Wage workers explain only 61.1% of total employment while UIS,
by nature, can not protect non-wage workers against unemployment. The number of
registered employees de facto does not exceed 70.6% of those to be covered legitimately and
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most of temporary and daily employees are still excluded from the UIS. Actual benefit
duration is limited because of benefit duration rules and short history of EIS. And finally
criteria judging whether or not a claimant is involuntarily unemployed are strict.
(2) Livelihood Protection for the Poor
As UIS could not protect large part of the jobless from income loss in the face of massive
unemployment, poverty among the jobless and the low-income families had to be addressed
with different measures. The preexisting livelihood protection program, based on the
Livelihood Protection Act (1961), have provided income support to the poor whose income is
below certain level (230,000 won/month per person). In 1997, about 1.2 million people were
protected under the program. However cash living allowances were paid only to those who
were not able to work (disabled, sick, or too old, etc) and had no income. For all others who
possessed work ability, the government subsidized only living, educational, medical,
maternity and funeral expenses. In fact, among the 1.2 million less than half of them received
cash living allowances.
With the advent of the crisis, the government expanded the program and introduced
Temporary Livelihood Protection program in March 1998 in order to protect the livelihood of
the poor unemployed who did not qualify for UI benefits. This temporary program also
provided low-interest long-term loans for livelihood, support for housing, medical, and
educational costs, and low-interest loans for the self-employed (Phang, 1999).
The Temporary Livelihood Protection program relaxed wealth criterion of preexisting
livelihood protection program. Those who possessed property worth less than 44 million won,
instead of 29 million won, could qualify for the program. In 1998, about 311,000
unemployed people were protected by this program.
The temporary livelihood program, however, was still too restrictive in its coverage and
generosity to be a substitute for unemployment benefits. For example, the household of four
members could receive 250 thousand won per month under the program, while the minimum
living expenses of the same-sized family were estimated to be 880 thousand won. Although
the Korean government developed various social safety nets for the unemployed after the
crisis, their absolute level of social protection was judged to be low in the light of basic living
standard.
The government revised the Livelihood Protection Act into a new act, called “Act on
Ensuring People’s Basic Living Standards” in 1999, aiming to guarantee a national minimum
standard of living for all people regardless of their working capacity. The Act became
effective on October 1, 2000. The evaluation about it remains to be done.
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3.4. Public Employment Services and Labor Market Information System
With rush-in of UB claimants, the number of PES counselors even fell short of UI benefit
payment. It was deemed urgent to immediately expand the capacity of public employment
service (PES) for both for UB payment and for administrating other programs of
unemployment measures.
The number of PES agencies managed by the central government has increased from 52 in
1997 to 158 in 2000. The number of PES counselors has also increased dramatically from
141 to 1,948 during the same period (<Table 11>).
<Table 11> Number of Employment Service Agencies and Counselors
   (unit: agencies, persons)
   1997    2000
Local Labor Office 46 -
Manpower Bank 3 20
Employment Security Center 3 122
Employment Service Center
For daily workers
- 16
Total PES agencies 52 158
No. of Job Counselors 141 1,948
Note: 1) PES agencies and counselors of the central government only.
2) Manpower Bank are co-invested and co-managed by the ministry of labor and local
authorities and specializes in job-matching and job counseling, but does not deal
with UI benefits.
Source: Ministry of Labor.
To improve the quality of employment services and to create a user-friendly environment,
the government combined in 1998 the employment insurance division and the employment
security division of local labor offices into PES centers called “Employment Security
Centers.” These centers were based on the concept of “One-Stop Service” and were designed
to provide job seekers with all kinds of information and services, from job vacancy
information to vocational training. The most outstanding advantage of these centers is that an
unemployed worker can receive both unemployment benefits and job search assistance at the
same place. The government also eased regulations on private agencies for job brokerage and
strengthened its support of private agencies, trade unions, and employers’ organizations for
free job placement services.
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One must marvel at the progress the Korean PES has made during last 3 years. However,
as can be imagined from the motive of the expansion, the capacity of Korean PES is yet
insufficient to play an active role in meeting those challenges. One way of considering a
PES’s capacity is to look at the ratio of workers in the labor force to PES staff. For example
in 1997, Germany’s PES had a ratio of about 364 workers for each member of the PES.
Sweden’s ratio was 325 and United Kingdom’s was 745. Each of these PESs had a relatively
high level of capacity. In Korea, the ratio is about 10,910 workers for each member of the
PES (<Table 12>). It would be impossible for Korean PES to envisage offering the range or
depth of programs and services which can be offered by the German, Swedish or British
PESs unless there is a substantial increase in funding and person-years.
<Table 12> Number of Public Employment Service Agencies and Counselors, 1997
            (Unit: agencies, persons)
Country No. of Agencies No. of Counselors No. of Workers per
Counselor
Germany  842 93,000   364
Japan  619 15,320  3,401
Korea
(As of 2000)
 156  1,948 10,910
Sweden  570 11,000   325
United Kingdom 1,159 34,000   745
Source: Phang (1999); Ministry of Labor.
As for the labor market information system, the government launched an electronic system
in May 1999, called “Work-Net”, benchmarking Canada’s “WorkInfoNet”. Work-Net, which
can be accessed from the Internet at home, provides various information such as job
vacancies, vocational training programs, career guidance information, employment policies,
services of employment insurance, labor market statistics, and labor laws. Almost all of job
vacancies registered in public employment agencies can be searched in Work-Net unless
employers refuse to let the information be posted. Currently, more than fifty thousand visits
the site per day. Users want enhancements to make it more effective and easier to use and the
officials responsible for Work-Net have plans for a number of improvements. But additional
resources should be provided to expedite those improvements.
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3.5. Job Keeping
Measures for job keeping aimed to help firms at difficulty and subsidize firms for keeping
their employees during recess and to minimize layoffs. Both credit allocation and subsidy
programs were mobilized such as (a) providing viable small-to-medium size firms (SMEs)
credit guarantee service and bailout credits to protect them from bankruptcy; and (b)
supporting and subsidizing firms to adopt qualitative adjustments rather than layoffs if
downsizing is inevitable.
By expanding the seed fund of the Credit Guarantee Fund, the government provided more
credit to SMEs. Banks were induced to evaluate viability of SMEs and offer appropriate
credits. The subsidy programs were mainly funded by Employment Insurance3 in the form of
wage subsidy (‘employment maintenance subsidy’) to the employers who conform to the
subsidized plans.
Employment maintenance subsidy is intended to keep dismissals through employment
adjustment as small as possible by providing wage subsidies to firms that enact various
measures to avoid outright displacement of their redundant workers. In the various measures
are included so-called ‘qualitative adjustment methods’ such as (1) temporary shut-down, (2)
reduction of working hours, (3) providing training to redundant workers, (4) providing
paid/unpaid leave, (5) dispatching or reassignment of workers. To be subsidized, firms should
be in a situation that employment reduction is inevitable for managerial reasons and should
adopt the subsidized practices. Subsidies equivalent to 1/2 to 2/3 (depending on the size of
the firm) of the wages or allowances paid to their workers are paid for maximum 6 months
In 1998, 74.7 billion Won was paid for the employment maintenance of 655,150 workers
and 5.9 billion Won was given to those firms hiring 5,185 displaced workers. In 1999, 79.2
billion Won was spent for the total number of 370,969 workers and 75.1 billion Won was
subsidized for hiring 101,359 displaced workers (<Table 13>).
Subsidy programs were first criticized on the ground that they could hamper or delay ‘the
structural adjustment’ of the economy by subsidizing marginal firms which would be finally
liquidated. However, subsidized firms are not necessarily bad firms destined to end in
bankruptcy. Good firms can face difficulties in cash flow when financial institutions do not
function appropriately and the programs were advocated as an important labor market policy
program.
However, the contribution of the employment maintenance subsidy in reducing
                                                                
3 Korean EIS has three pillars: Employment Stabilization Program, Job Ability Development Program, and
Unemployment Insurance. See Yoo(2000) for more details of Korean EIS structure.
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unemployment should not be exaggerated. The number of workers benefited from the
program was around 25,000 per month on average. Kim et al. (1999) examined the
employment maintenance effects of these subsidy programs using employer surveys as well
as case studies. The estimated effect was 22.3% on average, which implies that deadweight
loss is in the 70% range.
<Table 13> Employment Maintenance Subsidy and Others
(Unit: thousand won, persons)
1,998 1,999
Expenditures No. covered Expenditures No. covered
Employment
Maintenance Subsidies
74,653 655,150 79,220 370,969
Hiring Subsid ies 5,880 5,185 75,132 101,359
Employment
Promotion Subsidies 16,648 122,843 29,904 196,495
Total 97,181 783,178 184,304 668,951
Note: Credit guarantee for SME’s are not included.
Source: Hur et al. (2000).
Ministry of Labor and Central Employment Information Office, Monthly Statistics of
Employment Insurance, various issues.
The subsidy program worked not so much as incentives but as compensation. It is costly,
if not difficult, for the labor administration to determine whether the firm applying for wage
subsidy is in such a situation that employment reduction is inevitable. When business is
really in a serious condition, wage subsidy program, in most cases, would not work as an
incentive strong enough to induce firms to keep redundant workers inside.
Mainly large size firms utilized the subsidy programs. Procedures are complicate enough
for small size firms to apply for the program. Small firms do not have enough resource to put
workers in reserve. In sum, job maintenance program seems to have contributed to
compensating large firms which suffered involuntarily labor slack.
4. Summary and Remaining Policy Issues
With the adverse shock, Korean labor market fell into an unprecedented turmoil.
Unemployment soared up from day to day. Non-regular workers and low-educated workers
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suffered disproportionately the adverse impact. Jobs were precarized. A disadvantaged hard-
core group in the Korean labor market experienced unemployment recurrently even if they
did not fall into the long-term unemployment trap.
Faced with high and increasing unemployment, the Korean government put out diverse
and intense measures to alleviate the adverse impact of the crisis on the labor market. The
measures taken by the government can be classified into five categories: (1) job creation, (2)
training for reemployment, (3) UI benefit and social care, (4) job keeping, and (5) public
employment services and labor market information system
Even if unemployment decreases and participation rate is increasing, important labor
market and social problems remain, requesting policy considerations. In 1999, there were
35.8 million Koreans aged 15 and over. The average number of unemployed in any given
month was 1.4 million. Yet, in a typical month, just 0.1 million received unemployment
benefits and 0.3 million participated in public works programs. 1.7 million Koreans received
Livelihood Protection benefits at some time during 1999. Taken together, about 0.5 million
(around 36% of the unemployed) unemployed had been covered by those assistance
programs. This means, despite all that Korea has done, the nation's social protection system
still has more holes than net.
The unemployment rate is still twice as high as it was before the crisis.  Those who lost
jobs have become re-employed in less good ones and face precarious employment and
earnings prospects--that is, rapid expansion of non-regular employment is degrading the
quality of working life. Temporary and daily workers are much more vulnerable to
unemployment than before. Government regulations are expected to play an active role in
meeting those challenges. The crucial policy dilemma is that the Korean government has to
attain simultaneously the labor market flexibility and social protection for all workers
regardless of its status.
As of June, 2000, there were 12.5 million wage workers in the Korean labor market. Of
these, only 6.5 million employees (it amounts to 70.6% of the employees who are supposed
to be covered legitimately under the present law and 55.6% of wage workers who should
protected by UIS) were working in insured employment – that is, in jobs that would qualify
them for UI benefits in the event of unemployment. The gap in coverage comes from two
sources: employees who are supposed to be covered but are not, and employees who are not
now meant to be covered.
Thus, one of major problems with Korea's unemployment insurance system is that even if
Korea has expanded coverage of UIS to all firms regardless of their size, coverage remains
quite incomplete. The main obstacle to covering temporary and daily workers, who are the
main source of the gap, with the UIS is that there does not exist any employment career
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certifying mechanism for them. In order to overcome this, the employment record-keeping
system should be refined together with tax administration system (Hur, 2000).
Adapting the training system to a new environment is another important issue to be treated.
The restructuring triggered by the crisis continues and the structural adjustment of both
private and public sectors affects the labor market. Worldwide factors such as technological
change and globalization force continuing adjustments on the labor market. The Korean
government has expanded training programs of the unemployed both quantitatively and in
the number of programs provided. But the challenges of globalization accompanied by
technological change force training system to meet continuous training and permanent
education of workers. External labor market is rapidly developing in Korean economy and
the extent of traditional employment relation based on seniority is narrowing down. Firms
have less incentive than before to train their employees who will soon turn over to other
firms. This new environment is forcing the training system to allow more initiatives of
workers than training service providers or firms.
The PES capacity has been expanded quantitatively during economic crisis. But the
counseling service and the labor market information system such as Work-Net leaves much
room to be improved. Counselors do not spend much time in what is considered counseling
in PESs of other countries. They are involved in activities such as taking worker registrations,
recording job vacancies, providing labor market information and processing employment
insurance applications. The PES gave top priority to processing UB claims and in job
matching. Most job matching is now handled by private sector agencies and on websites of
private dot companies. In the future Work-Net will enable job matching service with
relatively little staff involvement. Now that the labor market has settled down, counseling
should receive more attention: organized counseling, counseling competencies, group
counseling, etc. The PES should dispose of additional resources for labor market information
systems especially on an improved occupational classification approach.
During the crisis, the Korean government tackled mass unemployment problems with
temporary measures such as large-scale public works projects. As the labor market has found
its ancient energy, the need for ad hoc unemployment measures is reducing. It is necessary
for Korea to develop a more systematic and comprehensive social protection system with a
long-term perspective in order to cater to the needs of the disadvantaged groups.
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ABBREVIATIONS
EI: Employment Insurance
EIS: Employment Insurance System
KLI: Korea Labor Institute
LMI: Labor Market Information
MOL: Ministry of Labor
NSO: National Statistical Office
PES: Public Employment Service
PWP: Public Works Project
SME: Small-to-medium size enterprise
UB: Unemployment Benefit
UI: Unemployment Insurance
UIS: Unemployment Insurance System
